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Legislative Responses to International 
Terrorism: International and National Efforts to 
Deter and Punish Terrorists 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International terrorism is a world-wide problem, afflicting democratic and 
totalitarian states alike. l As a result, the issue of deterrence necessarily raises 
unique problems in international law as well as in national law. A legal response 
to terrorism, therefore, must exist on both the international and national level 
in order to have any deterring effect. 
Difficulties in defining terrorism lead in turn to difficulties in combatting 
terrorism. Accordingly, the definitional and jurisdictional obstacles inherent in 
any attempt to deter terrorism through legislation require close analysis. At-
tempts by the United States to deter terrorist attacks through legislation thus 
far have been virtually untested.2 Recent incidents of terrorism, however, may 
provide a potential testing ground both for U.S. legislation and for international 
cooperation in the battle against often unknown or undefined enemies. For 
example, the seizure of a TWA aircraft on June 14, 1985 by terrorists falls 
within the scope of U.S. anti-hijacking laws as well as the recently amended 
U.S. kidnapping statute.3 Similarly, the taking of the Italian cruise ship Achille 
Lauro in October, 1985 is covered by the hostage-taking provisions contained in 
the federal kidnapping laws.4 
In order to effect the prevention of terrorism and the punishment of terror-
ists, the international community must agree upon a definition for the acts they 
seek to prevent.5 Unfortunately, terrorism does not easily lend itself to a single 
I Murphy, Legal Controls and the Deterrence of Terrorism: Performance and Prospects, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 
465 (1982); see Evans, Perspectives on International Terrorism, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 151 (1980). See 
Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 1984, at 28, col. 3. 
The geographic distribution of international terrorist incidents in 1985 is as follows: Middle East, 
46.6; Western Europe, 25.6; Latin America, 16.3; Asia, 5.7; Africa, 5.1; North America, 0.5; Eastern 
Europe, 0.2. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism 3 (1986) 
[hereinafter cited as Vice President's Task Force]. 
2 The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, however, that it has secured arrests or convictions 
in cases involving the United Freedom Front, the Armed Resistance Unit, the Red Guerrilla Resistance, 
the Revolutionary Fighting Group, the Aryan Nations, and E.P.B. Macheteros. N.Y. Times, Mar. I, 
1986, at 12, col. 6. 
g 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201-03 (Supp. III 1985). 
418 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (Supp. III 1985); 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1472, 1473 (Supp. III 1985). 
'Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment, and 
Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 431 (1975). 
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concept for definitional or legal purposes.6 There seem to be some sets of acts 
(such as hijacking and kidnapping) which, when performed, render a group 
"terrorist."7 While there appear to be certain universally recognized acts of 
terrorism,s the world community has yet to agree upon a general definition.9 
With the increase in terrorist acts around the world,1O and the corresponding 
increase in media coverage paid to such acts, terrorism has become truly inter-
national in scopeY The distinction between national terrorism and international 
terrorism, however, can be made on the basis of the motive underlying the acts, 
the position or status of the victim, or the jurisdictional issues involved. 12 Defi-
nitions of terrorism commonly focus on the terrorist's attempt to affect govern-
mental policy through violent action. 13 For the purposes of this Comment, 
6 Mallison & Mallison, The Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions 
to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL 
CRIMES, 67 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1974). According to one U.S. official: 
A terrorist group does not need a defined territory or a specific organization. Its goals need 
not necessarily relate to anyone country. It does not require a popular base of support. Its 
operations or its organization and its movements are secret. Its activities do not conform to 
the rules of law or warfare. Its targets are civilians, noncombattants, bystanders, or symbolic 
persons and places. Its victims generally have no role in either causing or correcting the 
grievance of the terrorists. Its methods are hostage taking, aircraft piracy, sabotage, assassi-
nation, threats, hoaxes, indiscriminate bombings, or shootings. This set of phenomena is 
international terrorism when the victim, the actor, or the location of the terrorist incident 
involves more than one country. 
Legillative Initiatives to Curb Domestic and International Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2470, S. 2623, S. 2624, 
S. 2625, S. 2626 before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Legillative Initiatives] (statement of Terrell Arnold, 
Deputy Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism, Dept. of State). 
7 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE: ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 157 (1983). 
"Americans readily recognize the bombing of an embassy, political hostage-taking and most hijack-
ings of an aircraft as terrorist acts." Vice President's Task Force, supra note I, at 1. 
8 Hijacking, kidnapping and violence against protected persons have been singled out by the inter-
national community as acts commonly performed by terrorists. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying 
text for discussion of the multilateral conventions proscribing the above-mentioned acts of violence. 
9 Paust, supra note 5, at 432-33. 
!O According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there were 800 terrorist incidents in 1985, with 
23 Americans dead and 139 injured. N.Y. Times, supra note 2. The number of terrorist acts has 
increased, with fatalities rising from 20 in 1968 to 926 in 1985. Vice President's Task Force, supra 
note I, at 4. See also McClure, Operational Aspects of Terrorism, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 165, 171 (1980). 
II The media instantly bring terrorist incidents to the attention of the world. One writer has observed: 
Political terrorism used to be a national event that seldom had ramifications beyond national 
borders. Now any attack against any prominent figure or against a commercial aircraft or 
against an embassy is an international media event .... Terrorism is international, and, as 
many say, it is theater. 
Sayre, Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization. Address Before the Third International Civil 
Aviation Security Council, in TERRORISM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND WORLD ORDER 481,481 (H. Han ed. 
1984). See N.Y. Times, Jul. 31, 1985, at A3, col. 1. 
12 Franck & Lockwood, Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism, 68 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 69, 78 (1974). 
!3 The difficulty in defining terrorism is reflected in the multitude of definitions proposed by 
scholars. For comparison, here are several attempts: 
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international terrorism is defined as intentional acts of violence committed for 
the purpose of coercing or intimidating policy makers in order to effect a policy 
change. Any definition must be broad due to the diversity of terrorists and the 
states in which they act.14 Although their acts may be characterized by common 
elements, terrorist motivations and targets vary widely.15 
This Comment examines the ability of the United States to apprehend and 
punish terrorists under current international and national legislation. The pres-
ent and future effectiveness of U.S. efforts to control terrorist attacks primarily 
will depend upon the willingness of the United States to employ existing legis-
lation and to supplement further national and international laws. 
Part II will focus on the international community's responses to international 
terrorism. Five multinational conventions are currently in force in response to 
terrorist acts. 16 The weaknesses in the enforcement of multilateral conventions 
will be examined in Part III. Noncompliance of both non-signatory parties and 
of state parties contributes to a weakened international response to international 
terrorism. Part IV will discuss the responses of the United Kingdom and the 
United States to international terrorism and focus in particular on 1984 U.S. 
national anti-terrorism legislative initiatives. In Part V, the limitations of the 
international conventions as anti-terrorist tools will be examined using the 
United States as an example. Finally, this Comment will conclude that further 
anti-terrorist legislation is needed, as is reform of U.S. national legislation, in 
order to effect a comprehensive legislative approach to international terrorism. 
Terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe than define. It is the unlawful use or 
threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is 
generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify 
their behavior or policies. 
Vice President's Task Force, supra note I, at 1. 
'International terrorism' is defined here as comprehending acts of violence undertaken by 
private persons, factions, or groups with the intent of intimidating or harming internationally 
protected persons, endangering public safety, interfering with the activities of international 
organizations, damaging or destroying internationally protected property, or disrupting in-
ternational transportation or communications systems for the purpose of undermining 
friendly relations among states or among the nationals of different states. 
Evans, supra note I, at 152. 
Terrorism involves the intentional use of violence or the threat of violence by the precipita-
tor(s) against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary target a threat of 
future violence. The object is to use intense fear or anxiety to coerce the primary target into 
behavior or to mold its attitudes in connection with a demanded power (political) outcome. 
Paust, supra note 5, at 434. 
Kidnap [sic], bombing, shooting, airplane hijacking - besides death, destruction, and the 
associated terror, what do these acts have in common? Most notably they are acts perpetrated 
by groups, or by individuals as representatives of groups, who seek not to hide their respon-
sibility but to advertise it. 
J. SCHREIBER, THE ULTIMATE WEAPON: TERRORISTS AND WORLD ORDER 15 (1978). 
14 Terrorists may act for various reasons. For example, some are motivated by politics or ideology, 
while others are merely random actors or "hired guns" of a regime. Evans, supra note I, at 152. 
IS [d. at 153-55. 
16 See infra, notes 25-29. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY THROUGH MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS 
In 1937, the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, as 
established under the League of Nations, drafted a Convention for the Preven-
tion and Punishment of Terrorism. 17 This convention was the first attempt by 
the world community to legislate against terrorism. IS The final draft of the 
Convention was a weak document, resulting from compromises made among 
participating states; it required neither extradition nor prosecution of offenders 
of the provisions}9 Although Poland supported the inclusion of a mandatory 
"extradite or prosecute" amendment, this suggestion was soundly defeated by 
nations wishing to retain complete discretion over extradition.20 The Convention 
was ratified by only one party, India, and accordingly never entered into force. 21 
After almost forty years of inaction regarding terrorism, the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations established an Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism in 
1972 in order to study the causes of terrorism as a means of developing legis-
lation to prevent terrorism.22 The Committee failed to reach an agreement. In 
its 1979 Report, the Committee reiterated the by then familiar obstacle facing 
the world community; the desire to distinguish national liberation movements 
from acts of international terrorism presented insurmountable conflicts.23 The 
group recommended instead that the United Nations try to eliminate the causes 
of terrorism, including "colonialism, racism and situations involving alien oc-
cupation."24 
17 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, League of Nations 
Doc. C.94M.47 1938 V (1938), reprinted in I B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP 
TOWARD WORLD PEACE 355 (1980). 
In 1918, President Wilson addressed the U.S. Congress, outlining the Fourteen Points. His last point 
stated that "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose 
of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike." F. WALTERS, I A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 20 (1952). At the conclusion of 
World War I, the Paris Peace Conference resolved to establish a League of Nations to maintain peace 
and promote international cooperation. Id. at 32. The Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted 
April 28, 1919 and was signed by 42 states. Id. at 43, 64-65. 
The United Nations was formed in San Francisco when the 50 states attending the U.N. Conference 
signed the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 1945. L. GoODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS 28 
(1959). The General Assembly met on January 10, 1946 and resolved on April 16 to dissolve the 
League of Nations. /d. 
18 The assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in 1934 led the Council of the League of 
Nations to establish a committee to study terrorist activity. Franck & Lockwood, supra note 12, at 69. 
19 F. WALTERS, supra note 17, at 53. 
'OId. 
'IId. at 54 . 
•• G.A. Res. 3034, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (1972), reprinted in 26 U.N.Y.B. 648 (1972) . 
• 3 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. N34/37 (1979), reprinted 
in I B. FERENCZ, supra note 17, at 547. 
'4Id. at 578. The United States objected to the differentiation between terrorist acts, asserting that 
all terrorist acts should be condemned. See 33 U.N.Y.B. 1148 (1979). 
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The failure of the international community to accept a comprehensive defi-
nition of terrorism has led to the adoption of piecemeal legal controls in an 
attempt to deter terrorist acts. Five multilateral conventions have thus far been 
adopted by the international community, each addressing a narrowly defined 
offense and each avoiding a comprehensive definition of terrorism. These 
conventions are the Tokyo Convention,25 the Hague Convention,26 the Montreal 
Convention,27 the Protection of Diplomats Convention,28 and the Hostage-Tak-
ing Convention.29 
The three conventions resulting from the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization (I.C.A.O.)3° conferences encompass most incidents of unlawful inter-
ference with international civil aviation. Avoiding definitions of "terrorism," the 
legislation applies to any person attempting to hijack an aircraft for any reason. 
The evolution of the conventions reflects a developing concern on the part of 
all states over the increased occurrence of hijackings.31 
A. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft 
The Tokyo Convention of 1963 was the first multilateral convention contain-
ing provisions concerning unlawful seizure of and interference with civil air-
25 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Conven-
tion) done at Tokyo, Sept. 14, 1963,20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter 
cited as Tokyo Convention). 
26 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague, Dec. 16, 
1970, (1971) 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hague 
Convention). 
27 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done 
at Montreal, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as Montreal Convention). 
28 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York, Dec. 14, 1973,28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 
8532, 13 I.L.M. 41 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Protection of Diplomats Convention). 
29 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 39) at 245, U.N. Doc. Al34/39 (1979),18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hostage-
Taking Convention). 
30 With the adoption of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.) came into being on April 4, 1947. T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 3-4 (1969). According to the Convention, the 
I.C.A.O. exists to encourage the development of international air transport and to insure its safety. 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 44, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 
295 (1948). The I.C.A.O. Assembly meets at least once every three years. Id. at art. 48(a). In addition 
the I.C.A.O. Council acts as a "permanent body responsible to the Assembly." Id. at art. 50(a). The 
I.C.A.O. is a U.N. agency with headquarters in Montreal. L. GOODRICH, supra note 17, at 274. 
31 Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with 
Aircraft Part 1: The Hague Convention, 13 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 391 (1974). 
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craft.32 Article 11 of the Convention addresses only the issues of restoring 
control over the airplane, resuming the flight and returning the airplane to the 
proper authorities. 33 Article 11 does not address the extradition or punishment 
of alleged offenders. 34 
Notwithstanding the broad language of the Convention, it took more than 
six years to obtain ratification of the agreement. 35 The reluctance of the global 
community to ratify the Tokyo Convention may be attributed to two factors. 
First, while the United States had already experienced hijackings in substantial 
numbers,36 the I.C.A.O. Conference drafted the Convention prior to the esca-
lation of such incidents throughout the world at large. Second, the reluctance 
of several states to condemn politically motivated hijackers led to further delay 
in ratification. 37 When the Convention entered into force on December 4, 1969, 
it contained no provisions for the extradition or punishment of alleged hijackers. 
The Tokyo Convention went into effect during a period of increased hijack-
ings throughout the world. Between 1960 and 1967, an average of five hijack-
ings took place each year. 38 For 1968, the average was 35, and by 1969, hijack-
ings numbered 89.39 Several previously unaffected nations expressed concern 
32 Tokyo Convention, supra note 25. The Convention was opened for signature on September 14, 
1963 and was signed by Congo, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Liberia. Panama, Philippines, Republic of China, Republic of Upper Volta, Sweden, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and Yugoslavia. 2 l.L.M. 
1042 (1963). 
3S Emanuelli, Legal Aspects of Aerial Terrorism: The Piecemeal vs. the Comprehensive Approach, 10 J. INT'L 
L. & ECON. 503, 505 (1975). 
Article II reads: 
1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat thereof an act of 
interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when 
such an act is about to be committed, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures 
to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the 
aircraft. 
2. In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the Contracting States in which the 
aircraft lands shall permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as 
practicable, and shall return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to 
possession. 
Tokyo Convention, supra note 25, at art. 11(1) and (2). 
3. Emanuelli, supra note 33, at 505. 
'5 Abramovsky, supra note 31, at 389. Tokyo Convention, supra note 25, at art. 21(1) requires 
ratification by 12 states. 
36 Abramovsky, supra note 31, at 391. 
In 1960, there were no hijackings of aircraft of U.S. registry. Nine years later, 40 hijackings of U.S. 
planes were recorded. Evans, Aircraft and Aviation Facilities, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM 3, 5 (A. Evans and J. Murphy eds. 1978). 
As early as 1961, the United States included hijacking as an extraditable offense and adopted federal 
legislation making aircraft piracy an offense. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) through (n) (1976). 
37 Disagreement over the politically motivated hijacker, especially one seeking political asylum, led 
Austria, Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany to question a blanket condemnation of 
hijacking. Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is Being Done, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 652 (1973). 
38 Evans, supra note 36, at 4. 
39Id. 
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over these increased hijackings and their inability to deter such incidents.4o The 
international community responded with two conventions that specifically ad-
dress hijacking. 
B. The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
The marked increase in hijackings in the late 1960s led the I.C.A.O. Assembly 
to request a study of possible solutions to the problem.41 In 1970, the Hague 
Convention was adopted in order to deter acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft. 42 
Under the Convention, an offense is committed when three requirements are 
met. 43 First, the offense must take place on board an aircraft. 44 Second, the 
aircraft must be "in flight."45 Third, the seizure must be the result of unlawful 
or attempted use of force, threat or intimidation.46 In addition, it is also an 
offense to act as an accomplice to a person who commits or attempts to commit 
an offense.47 
The Convention compels contracting parties to establish jurisdiction over 
alleged offenders in several circumstances. Under Article 4, up to three states 
potentially have concurrent jurisdiction over alleged offenders: (1) the state of 
registry of the aircraft;48 (2) the state of landing, if the alleged offender is still 
on board;49 (3) any state party to the Convention where an alleged offender is 
40 Abramovsky, supra note 31, at 39l. 
For example, the U.S.S.R. joined the I.C.A.O. in 1970 and participated in the promulgation of the 
Hague Convention. 
The number of hijackings occurring outside of the United States increased from one in 1963 to 45 
by 1970. Evans, supra note 37, at 643. The increase in hijackings led to the prompt conclusion of the 
Hague and Montreal Conventions. Id. at 652. 
41 I.C.A.O. Assembly Res. AI6-37, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8779 at 92 (1968). 
42 Hague Convention, supra note 26, preamble. 
43 Article 1 of the Convention establishes the elements of an offense: 
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: 
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, 
or by any other form of intimidation, 
seizes, or exercises control of, that 
aircraft, or attempts to perform any such 
act, or 
(b) is an accomplice of a person who 
performs or attempts to perform any such act 
commits an offence. 
!d. at art. l. 
44Id. 
45 Note that "in flight" here is defined as "any time from the moment when all external doors are 
closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation." 
!d. at art. 3(1). Cj. Tokyo Convention, supra note 25, at art. 1(3): "The moment when power is applied 
for purpose of takeoff until the moment when the landing run ends." 
46 Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 1 (a). 
47Id. at art. I(b). 
48Id. at art. 4(1)(a). 
49Id. at art. 4(1)(b). 
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found and that state does not extradite to the other two states having concurrent 
jurisdiction.50 Jurisdiction based on passive nationality51 is also permitted where 
that state's domestic law so provides.52 
The Convention provides in Article 7 that a state party, if it refuses to 
extradite to another state party, must submit the alleged offender to competent 
authorities for prosecution.53 Such authorities, in turn, are required to regard 
the case as an ordinary offense of a serious nature under the law of that state.54 
Further, each state is obligated "to make the offense punishable by severe 
penalties."55 
Although the Convention does not obligate parties to extradite alleged of-
fenders, Article 8 facilitates the extradition process.56 Unlawful seizure of an 
aircraft must be included as an extraditable offense in any existing or future 
extradition treaty contracted between state parties.57 Further, the Convention 
provides that state parties that do not make extradition dependent upon the 
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offense as extraditable between them-
selves.58 Extradition of an alleged offender, however, remains optional and 
subject to the domestic laws of the requested state.59 Again, according to Article 
7, if a requested state refuses to extradite an alleged hijacker, it must submit 
the offender to competent prosecuting authorities.60 
Extradition is not required by international law.61 Even where extradition 
treaties exist between two states, most countries recognize a political offense 
exception.62 Drafters of the Hague Convention confronted the problem of 
SOld. at art. 4(2). 
51 There are five theories of jurisdiction in international law. A state has territorial jurisdiction over 
offenses committed within its borders. Active personality or nationality allows jurisdiction over a state's 
citizens. Passive personality enables jurisdiction by the state of the victim of the offense. Universality 
entitles any state to exercise jurisdiction over the offender. The protective principle allows a state 
jurisdiction in circumstances where its national security is in jeopardy. HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw, jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935). 
52 Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 4(3). 
53 ld. at art. 7. 
541d. 
55 ld. at art. 2. One commentator has suggested that the Convention remains silent on the issue of 
a minimum period of imprisonment in order to attract the maximum number of states to ratify the 
Convention and to avoid interference with the sovereign's right to punish offenders as it sees fit. 
Abramovsky, supra note 31, at 399. 
56 Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 8(1) states: 
ld. 
I)The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition 
treaty existing between Contracting States. 
57 ld. 
5sld. at art. 8(3). 
591d. at art. 8(2). 
60 ld. at art. 7. 
61 1 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE I § 2-1, 2-2 
(1983). 
621d. at VIII § 2-3, 2-4; see, e.g., In Re Castioni [1891) 1 Q.B. 149 (English court refused to extradite 
to Switzerland a Swiss national accused of murdering a Swiss official during a political uprising). 
1986) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 331 
extradition of offenders who acted for "political" reasons.63 The countries in 
attendance at the Conference were divided on the issue of extradition. One 
group proposed the mandatory extradition of alleged offenders to the state of 
registry of the aircraft. 64 A second group opposed such a provision, on the basis 
that it would prevent a state from granting asylum to political refugees.65 In an 
effort to obtain a maximum number of signatories, the drafters chose not to 
interfere with the sovereignty of nations party to the Convention.66 Article 8 of 
the Convention adopted the latter proposal leaving unaffected existing discre-
tionary national extradition law. 
In sum, the Hague Convention was drafted and adopted specifically to rem-
edy existing technical omissions in the domestic laws of contracting states.67 
Prior to the drafting of the Convention, the I.C.A.O.'s Legal Committee studied 
the problem of hijacking and found that hijacking was not itself an offense in 
a majority of states.68 Further, the state of registration of the hijacked aircraft, 
usually the state having the greatest incentive to prosecute an offender, often 
could not obtain extradition from the state where the offender sought refuge.69 
In addition, the state in which the offender was found often was unable to 
prosecute because the offense had been committed outside that state's jurisdic-
tion.70 The Hague Convention removed these obstacles to the exercise of juris-
diction over alleged hijackers and facilitated extradition. 
C. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation 
Although the Hague Convention does cover acts of unlawful seizure or con-
trol of aircraft, these acts often overlap with acts of destruction or interference 
with the aircraft and harm to those on board. Since the Tokyo Convention 
63 Abramovsky, supra note 31, at 40 I. 
64 Id. See White, The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 6 REV. INT'L 
COMM'N JURISTS 38, 43 (1971). 
Motivations behind each group differed: 
The Vnited States supported mandatory extradition in response to public outrage at the occurrence 
of hijackings. Abramovsky, supra note 31, at 402. The V.S.S.R. and other Eastern European states 
supported mandatory extradition because hijacking is a viable means of leaving a country where 
immigration is restricted. Id. 
65 In Western Europe, many opposed mandatory extradition, as it would require the return of 
persons who had employed hijackings as a method of escape from restrictive governments. Other 
nations opposed mandatory extradition for political reasons, refusing to relinquish their sovereign 
right to decide whether alleged offenders would be extradited and to what countries. Abramovsky, 
supra note 31, at 402. 
66 Id. 
67 White, supra note 64, at 38-39. 
68 !d. at 38. 
69 !d. at 39. 
70 !d. 
332 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.2 
addressed acts of unlawful interference with aircraft insufficiently,71 the 
I.C.A.O. Assembly chose to draft a convention which would specifically address 
the problem of interference with aircraft. 72 The Montreal Convention therefore 
covers any act of unlawful interference likely to endanger the safety of the 
aircraft in flight. 73 
The Montreal Convention mirrors the Hague Convention in several respects. 
Article 5 provides for concurrent jurisdiction for up to four states.74 It appears, 
however, that in practice, the state which first apprehends the offender receives 
primary jurisdiction.75 Article 7 provides for discretionary prosecution.76 Under 
the aut dedere aut judicare77 principle, a state must submit an alleged offender to 
competent prosecuting authorities if it chooses not to extradite.78 As in Article 
2 of the Hague Convention, the Montreal Convention requires contracting states 
to inflict severe penalties upon offenders and does not suggest any minimum 
period of imprisonment.79 
71 The Tokyo Convention applies only to offenses committed on board an aircraft in flight. The 
Tokyo Convention did not address the issues of extradition or prosecution of alleged offenders. Tokyo 
Convention, supra note 25, at art. 1(2). See text accompanying notes 33-34. 
72 Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Inteiference with 
Aircraft Part II: Montreal Convention, 14 COL. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 268, 277-78 (1975). 
73 Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. I. 
Article 1 of the Convention enumerates the elements of the offense: 
Id. 
I. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is 
likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or 
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it 
incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or 
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device 
or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it 
incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or 
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if any 
such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or 
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safety 
of an aircraft in flight. 
2. Any person also commits an offence if he: 
(a) attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article; or 
(b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any such offence. 
74 In addition to the exercise of jurisdiction by states in the three situations outlined in the Hague 
Convention, the Montreal Convention provides for jurisdiction by the state where the offense is 
committed.Id. at art. 5(1)(a). See Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 4. 
75 See Abramovsky, supra note 72, at 293. 
7. Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. 7. Participants at the Montreal Convention defeated 
by a vote of 35 to two, with six abstentions, a proposal requiring mandatory prosecution. As noted 
previously, many states refused to relinquish the right to distinguish between alleged offenders ac-
cording to varying circumstances. 
77 Aut dedere aut judicare comes from Grotius' aut dedere aut punire, "deliver or punish," DeJure Belli 
ac Pacis, Book II, chap. XXI, para. III, IV, at 527-28. 
78 Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. 7. 
79 !d. at art. 3. 
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Finally, the issue of extradition is addressed by the Montreal Convention in 
the same manner as the Hague Convention. Article 8 of both Conventions 
increases the likelihood that an offender will be prosecuted.80 By including the 
offenses specified in the Conventions in all existing and future extradition 
treaties among members, the drafters of the Conventions facilitate the ability 
of a nation to obtain jurisdiction over an offender.81 The fact remains, however, 
that extradition is not mandatory under international law or the Hague or 
Montreal Conventions.82 Contracting states remain free to exclude particular 
types of offenses from their extradition treaties, the political offense exception 
being the most common.83 
Both the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention provide a legal 
framework for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution 
of persons who attempt to interfere unlawfully with civil aircraft. Like the Hague 
Convention before it, the Montreal Convention enables nations previously un-
able to prosecute offenders to exercise jurisdiction or obtain extradition in an 
effort to deter such acts of unlawful interference with aircraft. 
D. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 
The Protection of Diplomats Convention,84 adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on December 14, 1973, closely follows the structure of 
both the Hague and Montreal Conventions. Prior to the adoption of the Pro-
tection of Diplomats Convention, the term "internationally protected person" 
had no meaning in internationallaw.85 As stated in the preamble to the Protec-
tion of Diplomats Convention, violence aimed against internationally protected 
persons "create[s] a serious threat to the maintenance of normal international 
relations which are necessary for co-operation among States .... "86 The Pro-
80 Hague Convention, supra note 26. at art. 8. 
81 States which do not have bilateral extradition treaties may rely upon the Convention provisions. 
Montreal Convention. supra note 27. at art. 8(2). 
82 !d. at art. 7. 
83 Id. For example. in In re Mackin. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). the court upheld the U.S. 
Magistrate's decision that the political offense exception applied where England sought the extradition 
of a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army for an alleged bomb attack on a British Army 
Installation. 
84 Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28. 
85 Wood. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. 23 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 791, 799 (1974). 
Diplomats traditionally enjoy a protected place in international law. For a history see Note. Terrorist 
Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189 (1972). See also L. BLOOMFIELD AND G. 
FITZGERALD. CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS: PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT 
(1975). 
86 Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28. preamble. 
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tection of Diplomats Convention applies to the intentional commission of specific 
offenses, including murder, kidnapping or other attacks against protected per-
sons.S7 
Unlike the Hague or Montreal Conventions, however, Article 2(1) of the 
Protection of Diplomats Convention specifically provides that the enumerated 
acts "shall be made by each State Party a crime under its internal law."88 The 
acts covered by the Protection of Diplomats Convention, unlike hijacking, are 
already offenses under the laws of most states.S9 Each contracting state is also 
required under Article 2(2) to render the crimes "punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature."90 
Article 3 of the Protection of Diplomats Convention requires contracting 
parties to establish jurisdiction over alleged offenders, paralleling Article 4 of 
the Hague Convention and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention. Article 3 
states: 
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the crimes set forth in Article 2 in the 
following cases: 
(a) When the crime is committed in the territory of that State or 
on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
(c) When the crime is committed against an internationally pro-
tected person as defined in Article 1 who enjoys his status as such 
by virtue of functions which he exercises on behalf of that State. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over these crimes in cases where 
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extra-
dite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in 
paragraph 1 of this article. 91 
There are, however, some modifications in the Protection of Diplomats Con-
vention. Article 3(l)(b) requires the state of nationality of the alleged offender 
87 [d. at art. 2(1 )(a). 
88 [d. at art. 2(1). 
89 Wood, supra note 85, at 805. 
90 Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28, at Article 2(2) is similar to Article 2 of the 
Hague Convention and Article 3 of the Montreal Convention: "Each State Party shall make these 
crimes punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature." [d. 
Article 2 of the Hague Convention reads: "Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence 
punishable by severe penalties." Hague Convention, supra note 26. 
Similarly, Article 3 of the Montreal Convention states: "Each Contracting State undertakes to make 
the offences mentioned in Article I punishable by severe penalties." Montreal Convention, supra note 
27. 
91 Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28, at art. 3. 
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to provide for jurisdiction.92 Also, a state must establish jurisdiction similar to 
passive personality under Article 3(I)(c).93 The provisions for establishing juris-
diction over alleged offenders are comparable to those contained in the Hague 
and Montreal Conventions. 
Two minor additions were made to the Protection of Diplomats Convention 
which do not appear in the hijacking conventions. First, Article 4 provides for 
cooperation among state parties in an effort to prevent the crimes proscribed 
by the Protection of Diplomats Convention.94 Second, Article 5 requires that 
the state of which the victim is a functionary must be kept apprised of the 
situation by any state having such information.95 
The key provisions requiring extradition or submission of the alleged of-
fender to prosecution contained in Articles 7 and 8 of the Hague and Montreal 
Conventions are likewise present in the Protection of Diplomats Convention.96 
On the whole, the technical aspects of the Protection of Diplomats Convention 
are similar to the Hague and Montreal Conventions.97 An international coop-
erative legal framework is established to facilitate apprehension, adjudication 
and punishment of alleged offenders of the Conventions. 
E. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
The ability of the world community to agree upon the Protection of Diplomats 
Convention and the Hague and Montreal Conventions indicated that interna-
tional legal action against international terrorism was feasible if a narrow set of 
acts were identified and targeted as unacceptable.98 Kidnapping and hostage-
taking are universally condemned as violations of human rights recognized in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights99 and the International Covenant 
92Id. at art. 3(l)(b). 
93Id. at art. 3(I)(c). Neither the Hague nor Montreal Conventions contains an equivalent provision 
but Article 3(l)(c) is similar to Article 4(I)(c) of the Hague and Article 5(1)(d) of the Montreal 
concerning the principal place of business or permanent residence of the lessee of the aircraft. 
94 Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28, at art. 4. Article 4 provides specifically for 
international cooperation to prevent preparations for the commission of Article I offenses whether 
they are to be committed within or outside the territories of particular state parties. Article 4 also 
requires the exchange of information and the cooperation of administrative measures to prevent the 
commission of offenses. Article 4(1) elaborates upon Article 9(1) of the Hague Convention and patterns 
closely Article 10(1) of the Montreal Convention. 
95Id. at art. 5. 
96 Id. at art. 7. 
97 L. BLOOMFIELD AND G. FITZGERALD, supra note 85, at 54. 
98 Rosenstock, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Another International Community 
Step Against Terrorism, 9 J. INT'L L. & POL'y 169, 172 (1980). 
99 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, 
at 71 (1948). 
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on Civil and Political Rights. 100 As reflected in the preamble, the Hostage-Taking 
Convention is an effort to prevent the "taking of hostages as manifestations of 
international terrorism ... " in violation of the basic human "right to life, liberty 
and security of person .... "101 
Similar to the earlier multilateral conventions, the Hostage-Taking Conven-
tion begins with a definition of the proscribed offense. Participants at the 
Conference rejected proposals by delegations to narrow the scope of the offense 
to acts involving "innocent" hostages,I02 and to broaden the category to include 
"masses under colonial, racist or foreign domination."lo3 Participants also re-
jected the suggestion that hostage-taking in the pursuit of self-determination 
be excluded.104 Ultimately, however, the drafters determined that the motive 
behind an act was irrelevant if the means of force were impermissible. lo5 Article 
1 defines as an offender any person who detains or attempts to detain another 
person in order to compel a third party to act or refrain from acting as a 
condition for the release of that person. I06 
The Hostage-Taking Convention requires state parties to amend their do-
mestic laws to punish the attempt or actual taking of hostages.I07 In addition, 
contracting parties are also obliged to provide international cooperation in 
preventing such occurrences. lOS Neither of these two requirements is new to the 
Hostage-Taking Convention, as similar provisions are contained in the Hague,I09 
Montreal,IJO and Protection of Diplomats Conventions.1JJ 
Although Article 5 contains provisions substantially similar to provisions in 
earlier conventions which require state parties to establish jurisdiction over 
100 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A. 
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52. U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
101 Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 29. preamble. 
102 The proposal was rejected because of the implication that there were some persons deserving of 
kidnapping. Rosenstock, supra note 98. at 173-74. 
103/d. at 177. citing U.N. Doc. A/AC.188/L.9. in 1977 Ad Hoc Comm. Report. 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 39) at 106-10, U.N. Doc. A/32/39 (1977). 
104 Rosenstock, supra note 98. at 177. For example. the Syrian delegation urged that a distinction be 
made between ordinary criminals and those engaged in the struggle of a national liberation movement. 
[d. 
\05 [d. 
106 The Hostage-Taking Convention reads: 
1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill. to injure or to continue to detain 
another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party. 
namely. a State. an international intergovernmental organization. a natural or juridical person. 
or a group of persons. to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition 
for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") 
within the meaning of this Convention. 
Hostage-Taking Convention. supra note 29. at art. 1. 
107/d. at art. 2. 
108 [d. at art. 4. 
109 Hague Convention. supra note 26. at art. 2. 9(1). 
110 Montreal Convention. supra note 27. at art. 3. 10(1). 
III Protection of Diplomats Convention. supra note 28. at arts. 2(2). 4. 
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alleged offenders, Il2 the Hostage-Taking Convention varies slightly. While states 
are required to establish jurisdiction on the bases of territoriality, nationality, 
and the protective principle, passive personality is optional.1l3 Although civil 
law countries urged the inclusion of mandatory passive personality jurisdiction 
in Article 5(1)(d), several common law delegations did not accept such a pro-
posal. 1 J4 In addition, Article 5 gives states the option of establishing jurisdiction 
over stateless persons residing in contracting states. Jl5 
The same provisions concerning extradition that appear in earlier conventions 
are included in the Hostage-Taking Convention. Again, Article 8 requires state 
parties to extradite or submit to competent prosecuting authorities an alleged 
offender found within its territory. Il6 Although the provisions are incorporated 
into extradition treaties among contracting members, the Hostage-Taking Con-
vention does allow a state to refuse to extradite under certain circumstances. 
Specifically, when the state believes the extradition is requested for "the purpose 
of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
ethnic origin or political opinion,"JJ7 it may refuse to extradite. Also, where a 
requested state determines that an alleged offender may be treated with prej-
udice for any of the above reasons, or that communication between the State 
entitled to protect the offender and the offender cannot be ensured, it may 
also refuse to extradite. Ils Although this provision departs from previous con-
ventions, it does not interfere with the system of practice prescribed under the 
Hague, Montreal, and Protection of Diplomats Conventions. Il9 
The existing framework for international cooperation in curbing terrorism is 
a compromise by the international community reflecting an inability both to 
agree upon the scope of terrorism and to adopt a comprehensive legal control. 120 
In light of the failure to reach an agreement on an anti-terrorism convention, 
the five multilateral conventions currently in force target specific actions which 
are generally condemned as unacceptable by the contracting parties. 121 The 
legal framework established in each convention is an attempt to deter prohibited 
112 See Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 4; Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. 5; 
Protecting Diplomats Convention, supra note 28, at art. 3. 
m Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 29, at art. 5(I)(d). 
114 The United States is generally opposed to the use of passive personality as a basis for jurisdiction. 
Due to the problems unique to the protection of diplomats, however, the United States felt justified 
in accepting such a basis for jurisdiction in the Protection of Diplomats Convention. Rosenstock, supra 
note 98, at 180. 
115 Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 29, at art. 5(1)(b). 
1I6Id. at art. 8. 
ll7 Id. at art. 9(1)(a). 
1I8Id. at art. 9(I)(b)(i), (ii). 
119 See Rosenstock, supra note 98, at 182. 
120 Costello, "International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle Aut nedere Aut Judicare," 
10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483, 500-01 (1975). 
121 Rosenstock, supra note 98, at 170. 
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offenses and punish offenders through widespread ratification and adherence. 
By requiring as many states as possible to exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
offender, the conventions increase the possibility that an offender will actually 
be punished. Furthermore, the conventions facilitate the extradition of alleged 
offenders, and overall, attempt to increase international cooperation among 
nations against acts of terrorism. 122 
III. PROBLEMS IN ENFORCEMENT AND ApPLICATION OF MULTILATERAL 
CONVENTIONS 
Although the ability of the world community to agree to cooperate in the 
prevention of certain terrorist acts has led to the adoption of five multilateral 
conventions, the compromises made in drafting these agreements are reflected 
in the inadequacies of those conventions. Gaps exist, for example, in the hi-
jacking conventions which result in incomplete protection against aerial violence. 
The Hague and Montreal Conventions apply to offenses committed while the 
aircraft is "in flight."'23 Such a definition undoubtedly excludes all acts of 
violence occurring on or against the aircraft before it is "in flight."'24 Further, 
diversion of one aircraft by another does not constitute "unlawful seizure" within 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 32-119. In addition to the five multilateral conventions cur-
rently in force, there are three regional conventions which also require state parties to extradite or 
prosecute offenders: the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, entered into Oct. 25, 
1978, art. 4, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 93 (Cmd. 7390), Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 
(1976). The Agreement on the Application of the European Commission for the Suppression of 
Terrorism (the Dublin Agreement), 19 I.L.M. 325 (1980). The Convention to Prevent and Punish the 
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of 
International Significance, done at Washington, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 37, at 6. 
In July 1978, seven Summit countries signed the Bonn Declaration, agreeing to suspend air service 
to and from countries which refuse to extradite or prosecute hijackers or return aircraft or passengers. 
Bonn Declaration on Hijacking of 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1285 (1978). The document represents 
a political agreement and is not legally binding. Murphy, supra note 1, at 476. For discussions of the 
legal issues and implications of the Declaration, see Busuttil, The Bonn Declaration on International 
Terrorism: A Non-Binding International Agreement on Aircraft Hijacking, 31 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 494 (1982); 
Comment, Skyjacking and the Bonn Declaration of 1978: Sanctions Applicable to Recalcitrant Nations, 10 CAL. 
W. INT'L L.J. 123 (1980); Comment, International Terrorism: Hijacking-joint Statement on International 
Terrorism by the Participants at the Bonn Economic Summit Conference, 19 HARV. 1NT'L L.J. 1037 (1978). 
The development of regional political and economic organizations is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. For a collection of essays on the subject, see REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS (B. 
Andemicael ed. 1979). The nature of the problem facing a state or states will often dictate which 
forum is the more appropriate, however, such problems are rarely exclusively global or regional and 
thus states come to depend upon both approaches. Id. at 3. 
123 Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 3(1); Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. 2(a). 
"In flight" is the period after which all internal doors are closed following embarkation and before 
any such door is opened for disembarkation. 
124 Emanuelli, supra note 33, at 509. For example, explosions or other acts of violence against persons 
occurring within or on the grounds of an airport are not covered by either convention. The recent 
bombings at airports in Vienna and Rome, for example, are not offenses within the definition of the 
Hague and Montreal Conventions. See N.Y. Time" Dec. 28, 1985, at AI, col. 1. 
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the meaning of the conventions. 125 Finally, the Hague and Montreal Conven-
tions cover only civil aviation; offenses committed by or against military or 
police aircraft are not within their realm. 126 
A. Noncompliance of Nonsignatory States 
In order for any multilateral convention to be truly effective, all parties must 
be willing to enforce the provisions. 127 Even if parties are willing, there are 
states not party to international conventions which may act as safe havens for 
offenders and hinder the international community's efforts to ensure extradi-
tion or prosecution of alleged offenders. 128 Nonsignatories of the multilateral 
conventions can themselves defeat the efficacy of these international agree-
ments. 129 
While a state party's failure to comply with a multilateral convention is a 
violation of international law, there may also be a violation of international law 
where nonsignatory states fail to act in accordance with principles of interna-
tional customary law. 130 In addition, according to the U.N. Declaration on 
125 Emanuelli, supra note 33. at 509. 
126Id. 
127 Franck & Lockwood. supra note 12. at 82. 
128 According to the U.S. State Department. as of March 3. 1986. the number of signatories to the 
I.C.A.O. Conventions were as follows: 
I) Tokyo Convention: 124. 
2) Hague Convention: 127. 
3) Montreal Convention: 128. 
According to the United Nations. as of February 13. 1986. the number of signatories to the U.N. 
Conventions were as follows: 
4) Protection of Diplomats Convention: 66. 
5) Hostage Taking Convention: 29. 
129 Murphy. Recent International Legal Developments in Controlling Terrorism. 4 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & 
AFF. 97. 117 (1984). 
See also Abramovsky. supra note 31. at 404. regarding particular treaties. 
130 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coop-
eration Among States provides that: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing. instigating. assisting or participating in 
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within 
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts. when the acts referred to in the 
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. 
91.L.M. 1292. 1294 (1970). 
A state which fails to extradite or prosecute an alleged terrorist is arguably responsible to the 
international legal community. It has been suggested that the use of international claims against states 
which sponsor. support or permit terrorists to take advantage of their protection may be a solution to 
the problem of safe havens. Such claims would be brought on behalf of persons injured by terrorist 
activities. These claims would result in compensation to the victim of the terrorist act and condemnation 
of the act itself. The likelihood that such claims would be successful. however. is questionable. States 
charged with responsibility for a terrorist act may deny such a duty and refuse to take part in 
international judicial or arbitral proceedings. Evans. supra note I. at 163. See also Lillich & Paxman. 
State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities. 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217. 307 n.379 
(1977). 
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Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, "every State has 
the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts 
of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized 
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts 
"131 
B. Noncompliance of State Parties 
An analogous problem arises where state parties themselves do not comply 
with the terms of multilateral conventions. A state which fails to extradite or 
prosecute an alleged offender when it is obligated to do so under a multilateral 
convention becomes de facto a safe haven for terrorists. 132 Thus, the enforcement 
of convention obligations becomes a critical issue in ensuring the punishment 
of terrorists. 
If a state cannot enforce treaty obligations through the International Court 
of Justice or other legal body, its alternatives may be armed force or economic 
sanctions. Under the United Nations Charter, however, "[t]he parties to any 
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to re-
gional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice."133 The use of force against states which support international terrorism 
may pose a greater threat to the security of the international community than 
the terrorism itself. 134 As legal measures fail to be effective in combatting ter-
rorism, however, the risk of armed force increases.135 
Economic sanctions, although permissible, may be very difficult to effect. 
Although the United Nations Security Council has the authority to declare 
In accordance with Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute forming the International Court of Justice, 
customary international law may be found to exist when there is (l) a national element manifested by 
a general practice and (2) a psychological element evidenced by a conviction that the practice is 
accepted as law opinio juris sin necessitatis. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CHARTER art. 38, para. I. 
See also Wolf & McGill, A Novel Response to Terrorism, presented to the Bar Association of the City of 
New York (use of countermeasures by a state victim of a violation of an international obligation as 
affected by Section 905 of Tentative Draft No.6 (1985) of the Restatement of Foreign Relations). 
131 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970). 
132 States which allow themselves to become safe havens permit a "[t]errorist, like certain corpora-
tions, [to] have the mobility to go jurisdiction shopping." Franck & Lockwood, supra note 12, at 82. 
m U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. I. 
134 Murphy, supra note 129, at 120. 
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the recent U.S. bombing of Tripoli raises several 
international legal questions. Characterized as a measure of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, the effect of the U.S. action in deterring further acts of terrorism by the Libyans remains to 
be seen. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 16, 1986, at A17, col. 6. See also L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 678-80, 704, 751-54 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952). 
135 Murphy, supra note 129, at 120. 
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economic sanctions,136 such measures may not be feasible due to the political 
climate and to pressures from the international community. 137 The adoption of 
a multilateral sanctions convention dictating measures to be taken against non-
complying state parties would pose potential legal problems of conflict with 
international treaties or international customary law. 138 Also, a state which re-
sorts to economic reprisals must meet the preconditions traditionally required 
for armed reprisal: (1) a prior international delinquency must exist against the 
claimant state; (2) redress by other means must be either exhausted or unavail-
able; and (3) the economic measures taken must be litnited to the necessities of 
the case and be proportionate to the wrong done. 139 Unilateral economic sanc-
tions rarely are effective measures against states which support terrorism since 
states in which terrorists find a haven often have only limited economic ties 
with the nations imposing the sanctions. 140 
C. Prosecution, Sentencing and Political Asylum 
Since the multilateral conventions do not grant priority of jurisdiction, in 
practice, the apprehending state determines whether it or another state will 
prosecute the offender. l41 As a result, the politics of the apprehending state, 
the involvement of its nationals in the incident and the threat to the state's 
sovereignty are determining factors in whether the apprehending state prose-
cutes or extradites an offender. l42 Further, some states may invoke three bases 
of jurisdiction in addition to those provided for in the conventions, namely 
active nationality, passive nationality and the protective principle. l43 
The "extradite or prosecute" principle incorporated in the multilateral con-
ventions contains an inherent weakness due to the political nature of the inter-
136 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter reads: 
The Security Council tuay decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of com· 
munication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 4l. 
J37 Murphy, supra note 129, at 118. 
138 !d. at 119. 
139 Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245. 252 (1976). 
140 Wolf & McGill, supra note 130, at 4. 
For example, the announcement on Jan. 7, 1986 by President Reagan of restrictions on trade with 
Libya in response to allegations that Libya is supporting terrorist acts. was not expected to have great 
impact on either nation. In 1984, trade with the United States amounted to 2% of Libya's imports. 
Feder, Libya Trade Was Low Before Ban, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1986, at A7, col. l. 
141 Abramovsky. supra note 72, at 293. 
142 !d. 
It should be noted that during the Montreal Conference, the U.S.S.R. proposed that priority of 
jurisdiction be granted to the state where the aircraft was registered in order to avoid disputes between 
states qualified to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 292. 
143Id. 
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national community. Where several states have concurrent jurisdiction over an 
alleged offender, the state in whose territory the offender is found has primary 
jurisdiction by virtue of the presence of the alleged offender. As a result, the 
extradite or prosecute option leaves the state with complete discretion. 144 A state 
may choose to extradite an offender to a state with lenient sanctions or it may 
choose not to extradite at all and instead impose a lenient sentence. 145 Even 
though a state must prosecute if it does not extradite under national law, the 
prosecuting authorities may find no offense has been committed. 146 Such a 
procedure does not violate the extradite or prosecute principle. 147 
The degree of punishment required by the conventions is not specified. For 
example, the Montreal Convention states, "[e]ach contracting State undertakes 
to make the offenses mentioned in Article 1 punishable by severe penalties."148 
In order to allow for the variations among signatory states, great leeway is 
afforded to the apprehending state. 149 As such, "[t]he degree ofthe danger, the 
motives of the offender, and, as between the nations concerned, the nature of 
their political relations and of any existing extradition treaty, will usually deter-
mine the severity of the penalties imposed."150 While allowing flexibility, this 
provision is potentially a basis for strained relations among states. 151 
Finally, the political offense exception traditionally included in bilateral ex-
tradition treaties allows states to refuse to extradite an alleged offender, thereby 
granting political asylum. 152 Article 12 of the Protection of Diplomats Conven-
tion and Article 15 of the Hostage-Taking Convention each specifically state 
that their provisions "shall not affect the application of the Treaties on Asylum, 
in force at the date of the adoption of this Convention, as between the States 
which are parties to those Treaties."153 Thus, the right to extradite or prosecute 
144 See Murphy, supra note 1, at 475. 
145 The N.Y. Times reported that an Italian court had convicted five Palestinians accused of gun 
and explosives possession in connection with the Oct. 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille 
Lauro and sentenced the offenders to jail terms of from four to nine years. The public prosecutor 
declined to seek the maximum penalty of twelve years because the Palestinians had struggled for a 
cause '''that cannot be considered devoid of valid motivation,'" although the defendants had employed 
"'terrorist methods.'" N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at A3, col. 4 (quoting public prosecutor Luigi Carli). 
146 See, e.g., Evans, The Apprehension and Prosecution of Offenders: Some Current Problems, in LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 493, 503-04 (A. Evans and]. Murphyeds. 1978). 
147 Emanuelli, supra note 33, at 511. 
148 Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. 3. 
149 Abramovsky, supra note 72, at 295. 
150 [d. at 295-96. These criteria are similar to those involved in the initial decision to extradite. See 
Evans, supra note 146, at 494. 
151 Abramovsky, supra note 72, at 296. 
152 Evans, supra note 146, at 49'1. 
m Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28, at art. 12; Hostage-Taking Convention, supra 
note 29, at art. 15. 
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preserves state sovereignty but allows states party to anti-terrorist conventions 
to grant political asylum in accordance with national laws. 154 
D. Terrorism As a Universal Crime 
There exist some crimes, such as piracy, which are internationally recognized 
as crimes against all nations. The Restatement (Second) on Foreign Relations 
lists piracy as an offense subject to universal jurisdiction. 155 Restatement Draft 
§ 404 expands the group of universal offenses to include piracy, slave trade, 
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps terror-
ism. 156 Comment (a) to the Restatement Draft states that U[t]here has been wide 
condemnation of terrorism although international agreements to define and 
punish it have not yet been widely adhered to because of inability to agree on 
its definition."157 
The Reporters' Notes to Restatement Draft § 404 indicate that multilateral 
conventions create an obligation on signatories to prosecute or extradite of-
fenders found within their territory}58 At the present time, U[s]uch agreements 
are effective only among the parties, but if customary law comes to accept any 
of these offenses as subject to universal jurisdiction ... any state will be justified 
in exercising jurisdiction with respect to the offense wherever and by whomever 
committed."159 
Even if terrorism were defined as an international crime, there is no inter-
national body or court to prosecute and punish the international criminal. I60 As 
the Reports to the Restatement Draft indicate, the punishment of an offender 
of all nations rests with individual states}61 As such, a state may (1) unilaterally 
154 Abramovsky, supra note 31, at 403. 
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 34 (1965). 
Piracy developed as delicti jus gentium, enabling any apprehending state to prosecute an offender on 
behalf of the states of the world. 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 61, at VI § 6-1. Delicti jus gentium 
encompasses crimes as defined by the law of nations. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 497-98 (2d ed. 1973). 
156 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (Tent. Draft No. L, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 
RESTATEMENT DRAFT]. 
The expansion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses "should not be viewed as a growth of 
nationalism and State sovereignty beyond the territorial frontiers. For the extension is rather a 
necessary measure which aims at protecting the international community against crime." Shachor-
Landau, Extra-territorial Penal Jurisdiction and Extradition, 29 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 274, 294 (1980). 
157 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 156, at comment (a). 
158 [d. at reporter's note 1. 
159 [d. 
160 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 61, at VI § 6-8 
161 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 156, at reporter note 1. 
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enact legislation granting jurisdiction, (2) enter into conventions, or (3) form 
international tribunals l62 as was done at Nuremberg. 163 
Legal proceedings, however, could be internationalized in one of three ways: 
(1) by allowing for the presence of an international legal observer; (2) by creating 
special domestic courts which have specific knowledge of international laws; or 
(3) by creating a court which includes an international member as an ad hoc 
judge who would assume the responsibility for the international law findings. 164 
An international criminal court that would try persons accused of crimes in 
violation of international law would allow states unwilling to try offenders, due 
to internal political circumstances, to submit the offender to a neutral judicial 
body.165 The creation of a supranational body to adjudicate violations of inter-
national criminal law would remove the process from the obstacle-ridden arena 
of individual nation states. 166 The establishment of an international criminal 
code and an international criminal code of procedure is a viable alternative to 
the present framework but depends upon the willingness of individual states to 
formulate and enforce such a system. 167 
IV. NATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
At present, international criminal law is defined through multilateral conven-
tions, and enforced through the domestic criminal systems of contracting 
states. 16S A multilateral conventions system which relies upon the municipal laws 
of state parties presents tremendous enforcement difficulties, for the efficacy 
of international legal controls directly depends upon the municipal legal systems 
of individual state parties and their willingness to employ such legislation. 169 
162 I M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 61, at VI § 6-8. 
163 M. BASSIOUNI, INT'L CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFT INT'L CRIMINAL CODE 9-12 (1980). 
164 Schutter, Problems of jurisdiction in the International Control and Repression of Terrorism, in INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 389. 390 (M. Bassiouni, ed. 1974). 
165 Mann, Personnel and Property of Transnational Business Operations, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM 399, 462 (A. Evans and J. Murphy 1978). 
For a history with documentation of the developments since World War I in efforts to establish an 
international criminal court, see B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD 
WORLD PEACE (1980). 
166 Milte, Prevention of Terrorism Through the Development of Supra-National Criminology, 10 J. INT'L L. 
& ECON. 519, 520 (1975). 
167 An international criminal court would remove the enforcement obligation from state parties: 
"The creation of such a court would entail the development of an international machinery of the 
administration of a new system of criminal justice. Such a prospect is unlikely given current economic 
and political realities." M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 163, at 26. 
Bassiouni contends in the meantime, that the international community will continue to rely upon the 
municipal legal system to enforce criminal sanctions for violations of international common crime as 
defined in multilateral conventions. 
168 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 163, at 22. 
169 Professor Bassiouni lists ten weaknesses in reliance upon municipal legal systems for enforcing 
international criminal law: 
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A. British Legal Responses to Terrorism 
As in the United States, the United Kingdom has adopted legislation aimed 
at international terrorism. 170 By contrast, however, such legislative efforts arose 
out of attempts to curb domestic terrorism, specifically in connection with 
Northern Ireland. l7l 
Through integration of international conventions, British national law has 
been expanded to allow for the extradition or prosecution of an alleged offender 
of a multilateral convention subsequently found within British territory.172 Fur-
ther, the United Kingdom is a party to the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism,173 and has amended its laws to provide for the 
extradition of alleged offenders of the Convention, without use of the political 
offense exception.174 
In response to terrorism committed within its own boundaries, the United 
Kingdom enacted legislation to extend police powers in situations involving 
terrorists. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974175 
allows the arrest of a person party to terrorist acts connected with the affairs 
of Northern Ireland. 176 The power to arrest, however, was not intended to be 
used against a party "concerned with terrorism known to be unconnected with 
Northern Ireland."177 In 1984, this omission was addressed when the Act was 
amended to provide for the exercise of the police power to detain persons 
1. States have the responsibility to act in compliance with a treaty; 
2. There are no measures to ensure compliance; 
3. There is no procedure for resolving conflicts; 
4. There are no protective safeguards for individuals; 
5. There is no overall framework; 
6. There are no rules for drafting its offenses; 
7. There are no rules for violations; 
8. There is no criminological policy; 
9. There is no system to ensure compliance by enforcing agents; and 
10. The entire system is subject to the internal politics of the enforcing agent; 
"In short, it has all the weaknesses and difficulties inherent in international law." Id. at 23. 
170 The United Kingdom has responded to international terrorism through national legislation, 
which on the whole enables the nation to fulfill convention obligations. The United Kingdom is party 
to the Tokyo, Hague, Montreal, Protection of Diplomats and Hostage-Taking Conventions, supra notes 
25 through 29. 
171 See infra text accompanying notes 174-75. Political and social pressures determine to a great 
degree the type of legislative action an individual state will adopt. Evans, supra note 146, at 494. 
172 Tokyo Convention Act, 1967, ch. 52; Hijacking Act, 1971, ch. 70; Protection of Aircraft Act, 
1973, ch. 47; Internationally Protected Persons Act, 1978, ch. 17; Taking of Hostages Act, 1982, ch. 
28. 
m See supra note 122. 
174 The Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26. 
m The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, ch. 56. 
1761d. at § 7. 
177 Home Office Circular, quoted in Walker, Legislation: Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Act 1984, 47 MOD. L. REV. 704, 705 (1984) citing H.C. Deb., vol. 1, col. 393 (March 18, 1981). 
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suspected of participation in "acts of terrorism of any other description except 
acts connected solely with the affairs of the United Kingdom or any part of the 
United Kingdom other than Northern Ireland."17s For the purposes of the Act, 
terrorism is defined as "the use of violence for political ends, and includes any 
use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public 
in fear."179 Thus, the new Act both recognizes the existence of international 
terrorism and enhances British efforts to extradite or prosecute alleged offend-
ers in compliance with convention duties. ISO 
B. U.S. Legal Responses to International Terrorism 
Anti-terrorist legislation in the United States, as in the international com-
munity, generally has been limited to the proscription of specific acts. Apart 
from legislation implementing multilateral conventions to which it is a party, 
the United States has not enacted substantial legal controls against terrorism. lSI 
Prior to the adoption of anti-terrorist legislation in 1984, the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) was the only legislation that pertained 
to terrorist activities. ls2 The purpose of FISA, however, was not to combat 
terrorism per se, but to authorize a procedure for the use of electronic surveil-
lance in gathering foreign intelligence information. ISS Under FISA, the United 
178 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, ch. 8, at § 12(3)(b). A person sus-
pected of an offense may be detained for up to 48 hours. [d. at § 12(4). The Secretary of State may 
also extend the detention for up to five days. [d. at § 12(b)(4), (5). 
179 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1984, supra note 178, at § 14(1). 
180 Walker, supra note 177, at 705. 
Additionally, the government has issued a police circular which states: "In the case of acts of 
international terrorism committed or to be committed outside the United Kingdom, the powers should 
be used only when it appears that there is some prospect of a charge before United Kingdom courts 
or of the person concerned being deported." [d. at 706, citing Home Office Circular, No. 26/1984, 
para. 91. 
181 According to Abraham D. Sofaer, legal adviser to the State Department, "the effort to apply law 
to modern terrorism is really in its infancy." N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at AI, col. 4. 
182 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). For a report by the Attorney General on the first five years of FISA, as 
required in 18 U.S.C. § 1809, see S. REp. No. 660, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
U.S. legislation proscribing piracy was enacted in 1948. 18 U.S.C. § 1653 (1982). Legislation per-
taining to hijacking was enacted in 1961. 49 U .S.C. § 14 72(i) (1982). 
18' S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3904, 
3905. 
Significant to this Comment is the definition of international terrorism included in the FISA, which 
provides terrorist activities are those that: 
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction 
of the United States or any State; 
(2) appear to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and 
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or trcnscend national boundaries in terms of the means by 
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States may protect against international terrorism through the surveillance of a 
member of a group engaged in international terrorism. Is4 
On April 16, 1984, President Reagan sent four bills to Congress designed "to 
attack the pressing and urgent problem of international terrorism."Is5 The 
stated purpose of the Acts was to deter terrorism "[w]ith trained personnel, 
effective laws, close international cooperation, and diligence .... "IS6 By October 
1984, three of the four bills, the Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Act for the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, and the Act to Combat 
International Terrorism, were adopted and codified. Is7 
1. Aircraft Sabotage Act 
Under Article 5(l)(a) of the Montreal Convention, contracting parties are 
required to take necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over alleged of-
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale 
in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 
50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982). 
184 U.S. v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984) (court upheld as constitutional the surveillance of 
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army suspected of exporting weapons to Northern 
Ireland for use in terrorist activities). See also U.S. v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
185 President's Message to Congress Transmitting Four Proposed Bills, 20 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
590, 591 (April 26, 1984) [hereinafter cited as President's Message]. 
186Id. 
187 Aircraft Sabotage Act, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, Oct. 12, 1984, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 2187, codified at 18 U.S.C. 31; 49 U.S.C. 1301; 49 U.S.C. 1472. 
The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking [hereinafter cited as 
Hostage-Taking Act] Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, Oct. 12, 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1203, reprinted in U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2186. 
1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism Pub. L. 98-533, Oct. 19, 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3071, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2706. 
The final bill in the President's October, 1984 package never passed Congress. As proposed, S. 2626 
prohibited U.S. citizens from aiding terrorist groups. Violation of the Bill included: (I) service in or 
acting in concert with a terrorist group, (2) providing training to a terrorist group, and (3) providing 
any technical, mechanical or logistical support to a terrorist group. Participation by U.S. citizens in 
terrorist groups or activities would have been subject to criminal prosecution. 
The Secretary of State would determine to which terrorist groups services would be prohibited 
based on a conclusion that a pattern of international terrorist acts, or likely acts, by that group would 
seriously affect the national security or foreign relations of the United States. The bill required an 
annual review to ensure accuracy of the list. 
First, the purpose of the legislation was to deter U.S. citizens from furnishing terrorist groups with 
technical information, the language was overly broad, failing to require a showing of intent to aid a 
terrorist act. Secondly, the bill permitted the Secretary of State to determine which groups would be 
subject to the provisions. There were, however, no requirements for differentiating between terrorist 
groups. The Secretary's determination was conclusive and was not subject to objections raised as a 
defense. As such, some persons or groups committing terrorist acts would escape the provisions of 
the law at the discretion of the Secretary. Finally, the bill presented the possibility that a terrorist 
group could circumvent the law simply by reorganizing. 
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fenders.188 Although the United States ratified the Montreal Convention in 
November 1972,189 U.S. national law was not amended to establish jurisdiction 
over alleged offenders until October 1984 with the enactment of the Aircraft 
Sabotage Act. 190 Prior to the adoption of the Aircraft Sabotage Act, the United 
States was not in full compliance with the terms of the Montreal Convention. 191 
This failure to adopt implementing legislation was seen as "an impediment to 
. .. diplomatic efforts to encourage further concerted international action 
against terrorism."192 
The Aircraft Sabotage Act brought the United States into compliance with 
the Montreal Convention. Accordingly, the major addition to U.S. hijacking law 
has been the extension of United States jurisdiction over alleged offenders of 
the Montreal Convention. As codified, the Aircraft Sabotage Act provides for 
the punishment of an offender who is found in the United States. 19g Jurisdiction 
applies over persons who have committed a crime outside the United States 
against an aircraft registered outside of the United States. 194 Thus, if a terrorist 
in England bombed an aircraft registered in Italy, that terrorist could be pros-
ecuted if subsequently found within the United States. 19S 
In addition to extending criminal jurisdiction over offenders of the Montreal 
Convention, the Aircraft Sabotage Act also serves as an indication of U.S. 
commitment to the deterrence of international terrorism through legislation. 196 
Although the United States was an original signatory to the Montreal Conven-
188 Montreal Convention art. 5(1) and (2) states: 
(1) Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offences in the following cases: 
(a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State; 
(b) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that State; 
(c) ~hen the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its territory with 
the alleged offender still on board; 
(d) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft leased without crew to a 
lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such place of business, 
his permanent residence, in that State. 
(2) Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish 
its jurisdiction over the offences mentioned in Article 1, paragraph (a), (b) and (c), and in 
Article 1, paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to those offences, in the case where 
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to 
Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at 5(1) and (2). 
189 Oct. 3, 1972, 118 CONGo REC. 33374, 33376 (1972). 
190 Aircraft Sabotage Act, Pub. L. 98-473, Title 11, Oct. 12, 1984, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2187. 
191 S. REP. No. 619, 98th Congo 2d Sess. 1-2 (1984). 
192 Legislative Initiatives to Curb Domestic and International Terrorism, supra note 6, at 48 (prepared 
statement of Victoria Toensing, Dep. Ass't Attorney Gen'l, Criminal Div., Dept. of Justice). 
193 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) (Supp. III 1985). 
194/d. 
195 Legislative Initiatives, supra note 6, at 47. 
196 Leich, Current Developments: Four Bills Proposed by President Reagan to Counter Terrorism, 78 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 915, 916 (1984). 
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tion,197 the absence of enabling national legislation was a weakness in U.S. anti 
terrorist policy.198 The enactment of the Aircraft Sabotage Act brings the U.S. 
legal position into line with the Montreal Convention requirements and further 
emphasizes U.S. dedication to international legal controls and cooperation in 
fighting terrorism. 
2. Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking 
In order to fulfill its obligations under the Hostage-Taking Convention l99 and 
to establish hostage-taking as a crime, the United States adopted the Act for 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking.20o Analogous 
to the enabling provisions of the Aircraft Sabotage Act,201 the Act for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking amends the federal 
kidnapping laws202 to provide the United States with jurisdiction over an of-
fender who is subsequently found within the United States.203 Jurisdiction also 
applies where the offender or the person seized is a national of the United 
States,204 or where demands are made of the U.S. government. 
The federal kidnapping statute, as amended, provides for U.S. jurisdiction 
in all cases required and permitted by the Hostage-Taking Convention. In 
addition to territoriality,205 nationality,206 the protective principle,207 and univer-
sality,208 the Hostage-Taking Convention allows state parties to exercise juris-
diction "with respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State 
considers it appropriate.''209 The use of passive personality jurisdiction by the 
197 See 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971). 
198 President's Message, supra note 185, at 592. U.S. legislation sends a message to terrorists: 
[T]he gap in the United States laws with respect to implementation of the Montreal Conven-
tion has not proved disabling for our Government. But as long as that gap exists, so does the 
danger that it might be misinterpreted as a lessening of our determination to close every door 
against criminal acts that threaten the safety of civil aviation. Prompt enactment of S. 2623 
will eliminate the danger of any such misinterpretation and send a strong signal of our 
continuing resolve in this important score. 
Legislative Initiatives, supra note 6, at 134 (statement of James E. Landry, Sr. V.P. and Gen'l Counsel, 
Airline Pilots' Ass'n). 
199 Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 29, at art. 5( I) and (2). 
200 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. III 1985). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 193-95. 
202 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982). 
203 18 U.S.c. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985). 
204 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(I)(A) and (C) (Supp. III 1985). 
205 Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 29, at art. 5(1)(a). 
2061d. at art. 5(1)(b). 
2071d. at art. 5(1)(c). 
2081d. at art. 5(2). 
2091d. at art 5(l)(d). Legislation currently under consideration in the House would amend U.S. law 
to provide for the prosecution of terrorists who murder U.S. citizens outside the United States. H.R. 
4125, Terrorists Prosecution Act of 1985. 
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United States reflects a belief that "the crime of hostage-taking is approaching 
in the international community a status similar to that which piracy has had 
under international law."2Io The government, however, has indicated that the 
statute will be invoked only where there is a compelling federal interest in-
volved.211 
3. Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts 
The Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts (Rewards 
for Information Act),212 located in Title I of the 1984 Act to Combat Interna-
tional Terrorism,2U is designed to deter terrorist acts through advanced warning 
and to facilitate apprehension and prosecution of alleged terrorists. The statute 
is constructed to appeal to law-abiding persons and disgruntled terrorists alike, 
for the reward is available to anyone who discloses information concerning 
terrorist activities.214 
According to a House Foreign Affairs Committee Report, "[s]trong and timely 
intelligence is clearly the most effective first-line defense against terrorism."215 
Under the Rewards for Information Act, the Attorney General is authorized to 
pay rewards to any person who provides information which (1) leads to the 
arrest or conviction in any country for the commission of an act of terrorism 
against a U.S. person or property,216 (2) leads to the arrest or conviction in any 
210 Legislative Initintives, supra note 6, at 127 (responses of the U.S. Dept. of Justice to written questions 
of Senator Leahy). 
A similar basis of jurisdiction exists in U.S. piracy law, 18 U.S.C. § 1653 (1982), and U.S. hijacking 
law, 49 U .S.C. § 1472(i) (1982) covers U.S. registered aircraft. 
211 Legislative Initiatives, supra note 6, at 49. 
In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(2) is designed to allow state and local authorities to maintain 
jurisdiction over local kidnappings. 
One commentator has stated, however, that "[i]t is expected that most kidnapings and hostage-
takings will continue to be handled by those [state and local] authorities and that the federal govern-
ment will not unnecessarily intervene in situations that local authorities can handle." Leich, supra note 
196, at 920. 
212 Pub. L. No. 98-533; Oct. 19, 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3071, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS (98 Stat.) 2706 . 
... See 18 U.S.C. 3071 (Supp. III 1985). 
214Id. The Department of State foresaw that: 
The rewards program will also encourage informants to provide information invaluable to 
capturing and prosecuting terrorists. Importantly, rewards may also induce members of 
terrorist groups or others close to them to desert and provide information necessary for the 
capture and successful prosecution of group members, thus weakening the organization and 
negating its ability to commit further terrorist acts. 
"Dept. of State Justification for Funding," reprinted in CONGo REC. S13785, S13792 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 
1984). The Act currently allows offers up to $500,000. 18 U.S.C. § 3072 (Supp. HI 1985). Legislation 
currently pending in the House would raise the ceiling to $1,000,000. H.R. 4044. 
215 SELECTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE STAFF STUDY 
REpORT ON DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS, reprinted in 130 CONGo REc. 
Hl0457 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984). 
216 18 U.S.C. § 3071(1) (Supp. III 1985). 
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country for a conspiracy or attempt to commit an act of terrorism against a 
U.S. person or property,217 or (3) leads to the prevention, or favorable resolution 
of an act of terrorism committed against a U.S. person or U.S. property.218 
In addition to deterring terrorist acts, the Rewards for Information Act could 
also facilitate acquisition of evidence for use in prosecuting terrorists.219 If the 
United States were to obtain in personam jurisdiction over an alleged offender 
either through extradition or the physical presence of the offender in the United 
States, and chose to prosecute, there are potential problems in obtaining suffi-
cient evidence.22o The difficulties in acquiring evidence, especially concerning 
an act committed outside of the United States, arise because of logistics and 
politics.221 If the Act is successful in encouraging persons with relevant infor-
mation to come forward, sufficient evidence may be obtained in order to pros-
ecute a terrorist under a national law such as the Aircraft Sabotage Act or 
Hostage-Taking Act. 222 In response to recent terrorist acts, the U.S. Justice 
Department has placed several reward offers.223 At this time, however, the 
effectiveness of the Rewards for Information Act can not be assessed adequately. 
Title II of the Act to Combat International Terrorism is addressed to the 
President and urges international cooperation in combatting international ter-
rorism.224 Specifically, Title II recommends "severe punishment for acts of 
terrorism,"225 and the "extradition of all terrorists ... to the country where the 
217 18 U.S.C. § 3071(2) (Supp. III 1985). 
218 18 U.S.C. § 3071(3) (Supp. III 1985). 
For the purposes of the Act, terrorism is defined as an activity that-
(A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed 
within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and 
(B) appears to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnaping. 
18 U.S.C. § 3077 (l)(A) (Supp. III 1985). 
For example, the Act is designed to cover information on the location of an American hostage or 
of terrorist command centers. Legislative Initiatives, sufrra note 6, at 51. 
219 Legislative Initiatives, sufrra note 6, at 93. 
220Id. 
221Id. "It is one thing to know who the terrorists are. It is another thing getting the evidence and 
being able to prosecute them." Id. 
222 DEPT. OF STATE JUSTIFICATION FOR FUNDING, 130 CONGo REc. S13785, S13792 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 
1984). 
225 On October 18, 1985, the Justice Department announced a $250,000 reward for information 
leading to the arrest of the three men charged with murder and piracy for the hijacking of a T.W.A. 
jet in June, 1985. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at All, col. 1. 
The U.S. Justice Department offered a $100,000 reward for information concerning the slaying of 
four off-duty marines and businessmen in El Salvador. Id. 
See also N.Y. Times, July 4, 1985, at A8, col. 1. 
224 Pub. L. No. 98-533 § 201; Oct. 19, 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3071, refrrinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2706. 
225Id. at § 201(a)(I). 
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terrorist incident occurred or whose otlzens were victims of the incident."226 
Title II also recommends negotiations to establish "a permanent international 
working group"227 to coordinate an international anti-terrorism effort. As rec-
ommended by Title II, such a group would promote international coopera-
tion,228 develop new methods of fighting terrorism,229 negotiate measUres for 
exchanging information,23o and finally, study the use of diplomatic immunity 
by terrorists to further their goals. 231 
V. INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES: THE GAPS IN LEGISLATiON 
A. Limitations of the Prosecute or Extradite Principle: The U.S. Model 
According to current U.S. policy, extradition is permitted only on the basis 
of a bilateral treaty.232 The policy results from the desire to retain discretion in 
granting or refusing extradition requests of particular states party to multilateral 
conventions.233 Further, by refusing to enter into extradition treaties, the United 
States can determine to which states it will, or will not, extradite. Although this 
practice does not violate the terms of any anti-terrorist multilateral conven-
tion,234 there is potential for frustrating the goals of the conventions by allowing 
offenders to escape punishment. 
Four of the five multilateral conventions discussed contain clauses requiring 
extradition or prosecution of alleged offenders,235 and permit extradition based 
2261d. at § 201(a)(2). 
2271d. at § 201(b). 
228 [d. at § 201(b)(I). 
229 [d. at § 201(b)(2). 
230ld. at § 201(b)(3). 
231 [d. at § 201 (b)(4). 
The Act also contains Title III, on the security of U.S. missions abroad. Funds are appropriated for 
security enhancement at such missions for the protection of diplomatic personnel abroad. [d. at § 301-
304. 
On February 4, 1986, Secretary of State George Schultz also requested Congress to approve a $4.4 
billion antiterrorist security program at U.S. embassies abroad. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1986, at A4, col. 
3. 
232 Murphy, supra note I, at 475; I M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 61, at II §§ 3-1,3-2. 
The United States is party to one multilateral extradition treaty which has not been employed 
(Montevideo Extradition Treaty, Dec. 26,1933,49 Stat. 3111, T.S. No. 882). 1M. BASSIOUNI, supra 
note 61, at II § 3-6. 
233 Murphy, supra note I, at 475. 
234 See Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 7; Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. 7; 
Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28, at art. 7; and the Hostage-Taking Convention, 
supra note 29, at art. 8. 
235 Hague Convention, supra note 26, at art. 7; Montreal Convention, supra note 27, at art. 7; 
Protection of Diplomats Convention, supra note 28, at art. 7; Hostage-Taking Convention, supra note 
29, at art. 7. 
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on their provisions. In practice, however, some state parties, such as the United 
States, do not rely upon multilateral treaties for the purpose of extradition.236 
Extradition of alleged offenders of multilateral anti-terrorist conventions is 
not easily achieved under international or domestic law.237 Although the purpose 
of the "extradite or prosecute" obligation is to ensure apprehension and pun-
ishment of offenders, the possibility that either an extradition request might 
not be made or might be refused, is an obstacle to effective cooperation in 
fighting terrorism. 
Should the United States resort to methods other than extradition in order 
to apprehend alleged terrorists, serious international and domestic legal ques-
tions would arise.238 Obtaining custody of an alleged terrorist by abduction or 
kidnapping may achieve the immediate goal of prosecution at the expense of 
long term foreign relations.239 Further, in the United States, where an accused 
may challenge the circumstances of his return,240 such "informal" methods 
should be questioned.241 In addition, these actions may be violations of inter-
national law, as one court found in United States v. Toscanino.242 Future kidnap-
ping of alleged terrorists abroad, however, have not been ruled out by the State 
Department.243 While alternative means of apprehending alleged terrorists for 
prosecution exist, extradition is the only formal or "legal" method.244 
236 See supra text accompanying note 232-33. 
'" Evans, supra note 146, at 494. 
238 Resolution of the legality of apprehending alleged terrorists is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
For a thorough discussion on the subject see Evans, Acquisition of Custody Over the International Fugitive 
Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Acquisition of Custody); Evans, supra note 146, at 494. 
239 Evans, Acquisition of Custody note 238, at 102. 
240 !d. at 104. The Supreme Court has determined that "mere irregularities" in the apprehension 
of the suspect do not deny the court jurisdiction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)(apprehending 
agent failed to present authorities in asylum state proper extradition papers). Similarly, in Frisbie 
Warden v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), the court held that due process is satisfied when the offender 
present in court, is fully apprised of the charge and is afforded a fair trial. In the Frisbie case, the 
suspect was forcibly kidnapped by police agents outside their jurisdictional boundaries. 
241 !d. 
242 U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf United States Ex rei. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 
F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)(court held that kidnapping alone, without 
allegations of torture, is not sufficient to convert an abduction which is simply illegal into one which 
sinks to a violation of due process). Id. at 66. 
In Toscanino, U.S. officials had abducted an Italian citizen from Uruguay. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 
1974). The court stated, "[A)bductions by one state of persons located within the territory of another 
violate the territorial sovereignty of the second state and are redressable usually by the return of the 
person kidnapped." Id. at 278. Further, the court held that the abduction violated the U.N. Charter 
art. 2 and the O.A.S. Charter art. 17. !d. at 276. 
243 See N.Y. Times, supra note 181. 
244 Evans, supra note 146, at 493. 
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B. Political Offense Exception 
In general, there are two universally accepted exceptions incorporated into 
extradition treaties. A state may refuse to extradite an alleged offender if the 
offense is political, or if the extradition request is politically motivated.245 These 
two exceptions preserve a state's right to refuse to take part in the political 
disputes of another sovereign state or to grant political asylum for humanitarian 
reasons.246 In the United States, the Secretary of State makes the determination 
whether or not a request is politically motivated and, therefore, should be 
denied.247 The procedure for judging the political nature of an offense, how-
ever, involves the judiciary.248 
The political offense exception is a loophole in the extradition process. A 
British case, In Re Castioni, in which Switzerland was denied the extradition of 
a Swiss national accused of murder,249 first enunciated this exception stating 
"one cannot look too hardly and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in 
their political excitement."25o Although a generally accepted definition of "po-
litical offense" does not exist, the three tier test developed in In Re Castioni251 is 
still generally applied today in U.S. courts.252 For the court to allow a political 
offense exception, three requirements must be met: (1) there must be a political 
revolt; (2) the act on which the extradition request is based must be incidental 
to that political unrest; and (3) there must be political or ideological motivation 
behind the act.253 
245Id. at 504. For both a European and American history of the political offense exception, see 
generally Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COL. J. 
TRANSNAT'L i.. 381 (1979). 
246 Hannay, Legislative Reform of u.s. Extradition Statutes: Plugging the Terrorist's Loophole, 13 DEN. J. 
INT'L LAw & POL'y 53, 59-60 (1983). 
247Id. at 55. 
248 Hannay, supra note 245, at 383-84. 
249 In re Castioni, [1891]1 Q.B. 149. 
250Id. at 167. 
251 See generally, id. 
252 1 M. BAsslouNl, supra note 61, at VIII § 2-25 . 
... Garcia-Guillern v. V.S., 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 V.S. 989 (1972). In 
several recent cases, V.S. courts have both granted and denied the use of the political offense exception 
as a bar to extradition. For example, McMullen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 658 F.2d 
1312 (9th Cir. 1981)(the court found an ongoing political uprising in Northern Ireland, a rational 
nexus between the political objective and the bombing of British army barracks, and nationalism was 
the goal behind the bombing); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981)(the court here also found 
the existence of a political uprising in Northern Ireland, the shooting of a British army soldier was a 
related incident, and that the goal behind the act was nationalism); cf Eain v. Wilkes. 641 F.2d 504 
(7th Cir. 1981). cen. denied. 454 V.S. 894 (1981 )(here the court denied the use of the political offense 
exception in a case involving indiscriminate bombing of civilians because the petitioner failed to show 
a link between the means employed and the target chosen); Quinn v. Robinson. 783 F.2d 776 (9th 
Cir. 1986)(court found that although a political uprising was in progress in Northern Ireland. no such 
uprising was taking place in England when petitioner was alleged to have conspired bombing attacks). 
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Critics of the political offense exception point out the inconsistent policies 
the United States promotes by refusing extradition.254 By making individual 
determinations on essentially similar actions, U.S. courts are indicating that, in 
some instances, the goals of a group may justify the use of otherwise imper-
missible means.255 In addition, if the judiciary is involved in making determi-
nations concerning the value of an alleged offender's actions, there is by neces-
sity an imposition of U.S. national values on other sovereign states.256 By 
involving itself in such determinations, the U.S. judiciary participates in major 
foreign policy decisions. 257 
Suggested remedies for the political offense exception loophole include ac-
tions that might be taken at both the national and international levels. First, the 
United States could reject the continued use of the exception. 258 Such an act 
would, however, limit the state's ability to determine whether an offender should 
be extradited to a given state. 259 Second, the determination of the political 
offense could be removed from the realm of the judiciary. 260 Since the Secretary 
of State is given the discretion to determine whether a request is politically 
motivated,261 perhaps it would also be prudent to have the executive branch 
differentiate between political and non political offenses.262 Third, the United 
States could continue to promote adoption of bilateral extradition treaties which 
specifically exclude the political offense exception.263 Fourth, the drafting of an 
international agreement limiting the use of the exception in specific instances 
could achieve cooperation on the international level,264 Fifth, the international 
254 Hannay, supra note 246, at 56. 
255 In granting the political offense exception, 'These decisions appear to place a stamp of approval 
on, and thereby sanctify, terrorist activities of all kinds." /d. 
256 I M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 61, at VIII § 2-107. 
257 Hannay, supra note 246, at 62. 
258 Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-AmericanJurispru-
dence, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 61, 88 (1979). 
259 See 1982 Extradition Act, reprinted in 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 61. 
260 Hannay, supra note 245, at 410-11. 
261 See text accompanying note 247. 
262 See Hannay, supra note 245, at 410-11; Hannay, supra note 246, at 75. In Quinn v. Robinson, 
783 F.2d at 788, the government argued that the judiciary should not be the authority to determine 
a policy decision such as the political offense exception. The Court rejected this argument and cited 
Mackin, 668 F.2d 132-37, and Eain, 641 F.2d at 513-18. The court in Quinn argued that the judiciary 
is not involved in determining whether a political uprising is justified, but rather, whether it was in 
progress during the act in question. 
263 Such an agreement presently exists between the United States and the United Kingdom. U.S.! 
U.K. Supplementary Treaty, done at Washington, June 25, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104. 
President Reagan said of the U .S.!U.K. treaty, it "represents a significant step in improv[ing] law 
enforcement cooperation and combatting terrorism, by excluding from the scope of the political 
offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists .... " Presidential Letter of Trans-
mittal to U.S. Senate, 131 CONGo REc. No. 95 (daily ed. July 17, 1985). 
See also U.S.!Canada, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. 8237; U.S.!Costa Rica, 9/17/84. 
264 Evans, supra note 146, at 508-09. 
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community could allow the International Court of Justice or other international 
body to determine the criteria to be applied in cases involving the political 
offense exception.265 Such a procedure could only be effective, however, if an 
international standard definition of the political offense exception could be 
agreed upon.266 
C. Compensation and International Cooperation 
Even if international and national legal controls fail to deter acts of terrorism, 
and allow some terrorists to escape prosecution, victims of terrorist acts should 
be permitted, when possible, to seek redress.267 Recently, a U.S. court permitted 
victims of international terrorism to sue for damages.268 U.S. courts have also 
held airlines responsible for hijackings which occurred as a result of poor 
security.269 The cause of action, as defined by one U.S. court,270 is based on 
airline responsibility for the safety of its passengers while they are boarding, 
flying or disembarking an aircraft, as outlined in the Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules Relating to International Transport by Air of 1929 
(Warsaw Convention).271 
An international agreement penalizing states which fail to give effect to anti-
terrorist conventions, or which fail to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders 
would allow the victims to receive some compensation.272 The problem of en-
forcement, however, arises once again. If individual states are not willing to 
give effect to international conventions to which they are party, it is doubtful 
that they can be forced to compensate victims of terrorist acts who exercise a 
right to sue for damages. 
The recent U.N. Security Council condemnation of terrorism is an indication 
that the world community may be able to agree upon a terrorism convention.273 
265 1 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 61, at VIII § 2-108. 
266ld. 
267 Evans, supra note 1, at 163. 
268 See Lete1ier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d. Cir. 1984), cm. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2656 (1985). 
Assassinated Chilean diplomat'S widow was permitted to sue Chilean government. The Court of 
Appeals, however, held that the assets of the Bank of Chile in the U.S. could not be confiscated to 
satisfy the judgment. 
269 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a/I'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d 
Cir. 1973)(hijacking is an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention); see also Day v. 
TransWorid Airlines, 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 890 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977)(a terrorist attack resulting in death or bodily 
injury to a passenger is actionable under the Warsaw Convention). 
270 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 
(1979)(wrongful death claim arising out of airplane crash). 
271 49 Stat. 3000,137 L.N.T.S. 11 as supplemented by the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966,17 
U.S.T. 201, T.I.A.S. No. 5972. 
272 Evans, supra note 1, at 163. 
m On December 18, 1986 the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution which: 
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Since a multilateral convention, however, ill an agreement between states and 
parties who are not present at the negotiations,274 namely the terrorists, the 
convention must be a realistic offer on two levels. First, state parties must reach 
common ground among themselves.275 Second, state parties must agree to en-
force the provisions against all offenders.276 
Increased international cooperation in apprehending and prosecuting of-
fenders of existing anti-terrorist conventions would signify the international 
community's commitment to those agreements,277 Short of an international 
criminal court, an information gathering committee could be established to aid 
states in obtaining evidence sufficient to prosecute alleged offenders.278 While 
international conventions typically require international cooperation in provid-
ing prosecuting states with evidence,279 such cooperation can be difficult even 
on a good faith basis due to the variations in legal systems among state parties.280 
In addition, states could agree to exclude terrorist acts from extradition treaties, 
as the United States has done recently.281 A concerted effort to use the anti-
1. Condemns unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction; 
2. Calls for the immediate safe release of all hostages and abducted persons wherever and by 
whomever they are being held; 
3. Affirms the obligation of all States in whose territory hostages or abducted persons are held 
urgently to take all appropriate measures to secure their safe release and to prevent the 
commission of acts of hostage-taking and abduction in the future; 
4. Appeals to all States that have not yet done so to consider the possibility of becoming parties 
to the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents adopted on 14 December 1973, 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
adopted on 23 September 1971, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft adopted on 16 December 1970, and other relevant conventions; 
5. Urges the further development of international co-operation among States in devising and 
adopting effective measures which are in accordance with the rules of international law to 
facilitate the prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of hostage-taking and ab-
duction as manifestations of international terrorism. 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/579. 
On December 9, 1986, the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning terrorism: 
1. Unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever 
and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among 
States and their security; 
U.N. Doc. AlRES/40/61. 
274 Franck & Lockwood, supra note 12, at 88. 
275Id. 
276 Murphy, supra note I, at 490. 
277 Hannay, supra note 246, at 56. 
278 Murphy, supra note 129, at 111. 
279 See e.g., Hostage-Taking Convention supra note 29, at art. 11 which states: 
!d. 
States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion with 
criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth ... , including the supply of 
all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings. 
280 Murphy, supra note 129, at 101-02. 
281 Bassiouni, An International Control Scheme for the Prosecution of International Terrorism: An Introduc-
tion, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 485, 489 (A. Evans and J. Murphy ed. 1978). 
See supra note 263. 
